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NOTES AND COMMENT
SUSPENSION

OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION BY THE CREATION

OF

TRUSTS.-In Matter of Rohr,' the testatrix left all her property to her
executor, in trust, to distribute the income among her three sons during their lives. She made no disposition of the corpus of the trust
either before or after the death of the last survivor. In a proceeding
to construe the will it was held that the trust was void in that it
suspended the absolute power of alienation beyond the statutory
2
limitations.
There are two ways by which the absolute power of alienation
or ownership may be suspended; one is by the creation of a future
estate, the vesting of which is dependent upon the occurrence of some
future or contingent event, the other by the creation of a trust which
vests the title in a trustee.3 This discussion will be limited to the
latter. As a general rule, the mere creation of a trust does not, of
itself, suspend the- power of alienation, because the trustee and the
cestui que trust may, by uniting in a deed or contract, convey an
absolute title.4 But, as most general rules, this is subject to exceptions.
'130 Misc. 174 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
'N. Y. Real Prop. L. § 42. Suspension of power of alienation. The
absolute power of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in
being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. Every
future estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation, by any limitation or condition whatever for a
longer period than during the continuance of not more than two lives in
being at the creation of the estate; except that a contingent remainder in
fee may he created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the
event that the persons to whom the first remainder is limited die under
the age of twenty-one years or on any other contingency by which the
estate of such persons may be determined before they attain full age.
For the purposes of this section, a minority is deemed a part of a life,
and not an absolute term equal to the possible duration of such
minority.
N. Y. Pers. Prop. L. § 11. Suspension of Ownership. The absolute
ownership of personal property shall not be suspended by any limitation
or condition for a longer period than during the continuance and until
the termination of not more than two lives in being at the date of the
instrument containing such limitation or condition, or, if such instrument
be a last will and testament, for not more than two lives in being at the
death of the testator. In other respects, limitations of future or contingent interests in personal property, are subject to the rules prescribed
in relation to future estates in real property.

'Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 183, 57 N. E. 312 (1900); Wilber v.
Wilber, 165 N. Y. 451, 59 N. E. 264 (1901), In re Roberts, 112 App.
Div. 732, 98 N. Y. Supp. 809 (4th Dept., 1906).
'Robert v. Corning, 89 N. Y. 225 (1882); Re Sacrison, 19 N. D. 16,
26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 724, 123 N. W . 518 (1910); In Hope v. Brewer,
136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558 (1892), Testator devised and bequeathed the
rest, residue and remainder of his estate to his executors and their sur-
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Where the trust is created for a specific purpose which would
be defeated by a conveyance during its effectuation, the trust wili be
void, if by its terms it may extend beyond the prescribed limitations.5
The other exception is that brought about by § 93-3 of the New York
Real Property Law 6 and similar statutes permitting the creation of
what is generally known as the spendthrift trust.
Difficulty in determining whether the rule against perpetuities has
been offended arises when the creator names more than two persons
as beneficiaries. In such cases, we must look for the intention of
the creator to see whether he intended to create a joint trust to last
until the death of the last survivor, or whether he intended to create
separate trusts and constitute the beneficiaries tenants in common of
the property. If the former were the testator's intention, then the
entire trust will be void and no part of it can be saved, because the
trust is as much for the benefit of one cestui que trust as another,
and it is impossible to grant any preferences. 7 If, however, the intention were to create separate trusts, then the rule will not be viovivors, in trust for the purpose of founding and endowing an infirmary
for the care and relief of sick and infirm persons to be established in
Scotland. He directed his executors upon the establishment of said infirmary, within a specified time to sell and convert into money all of the
said property remaining unsold, as soon as practicable, and to pay over
the whole of said trust fund to said infirmary; and if said infirmary was
not established, within the prescribed period he directed the trustees to
divide and pay over said fund to other charities. It was held "The fact
that such conversion might require a period of time not measured by lives
does not create an unlawful perpetuity. It was said in Robert v. Corning
(89 N. Y. 225, 228) that such result is accomplished only when there
are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be
conveyed, andthat a discretionary power conferred upon executors, with
respect to the time of sale, did not suspend the power of sale or the
absolute ownership. It was within the legal power of the executors to
convert the whole estate into money the day after their appointment and
qualification, and to pay over the residuary fund to the foreign trustees."
'Robert v. Corning, supra, note 4; Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N. Y.
523, 28 N. E. 585 (1891), where the court said "And if the trust be
created, by which the possession of personal property and the legal estate
therein is vested in the trustees during the continuance of the trust, an
absolute ownership of personal property is suspeided wifhin the meaning
of the statute."
6N. Y. Real Prop. L. § 96. An express trust may be created for one
or more of the following purposes:
3. To receive the rents and profits of real property and apply them to
the use of any person during the life of that person, or for any shorter
time, subject to the provisions of law relating thereto.
'Fowler v. Ingersol, 127 N. Y. 472, 28 N. E. 471 (1891); Central
Trust Co. v. Eglesten, 185 N. Y. 23, 77 N. E. 989 (1906) ; Re Beale v.
Will, 207 N. Y. Supp. 257, 124 Misc. Rep. 96 (1926).
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lated because on the death of one beneficiary, his share will either
pass to his representatives, or revert to the creator in the absence of
other disposition. s When considering the subject of intention, it must
be borne in mind that the mere fact that the income is paid out of
one undivided fund does not raise a joint trust; the rule being that
though the income and principal are payable out of one fund kept
in solido for mere convenience in investment, separate trusts may be
created.9 What was said by Chase, J., in Leach v. Goodwin' ° should
be remembered in this connection, "In cases where a trust for the
benefit of several persons is held in one fund, it is necessary for the
purpose of holding that they constitute separate and independent
trusts, that each part of the principal fund should be liberated from
the trust fund upon the termination of the lives in being at the death
of the testator for which the trust is held, and also to find from
within the will itself that such was the intention of the testator."
There are cases in which the testator or creator, after creating
separate trusts1 1 for the benefit of more than two persons, provides
that on the death of any one of the beneficiaries, the corpus of his
share shall vest in his issue, and that in case of failure of issue,
then said corpus shall be divided proportionately among the remaining beneficiaries, to be held upon the same conditions as their original
shares. Again, in such cases, we must look for the intention of the
creator, for if he intended that the subportion should be redivided
upon the death of another beneficiary without issue, and so on, this
provision would be void, although the main trusts, themselves, would
be valid.12 In determining the intention of the creator, the courts,
'Leach v. Goodwin, 198 N. Y. 35, 91 N. E. 288 (1910); Schermerhorn
v. Cotting, 131 N. Y. 48, 29 N. E. 980, (1892); Wells v. Wells, 88 N. Y.
323 (1882) ; Vanderpoll v. Law, et al., 112 N. Y. 167, 19 N. E. 481 (1889).
"Supra, note 8.
'oIbid.
" Trusts referred to here are those allowed by N. Y. Real Prop. L.

§ 96-3.
12 Shey v. Shey, 194 N. Y. 368, 87 N. E. 817 (1909);
Corse v. Chapman, 153 N. Y. 368, 47 N. E. 812 (1897); Chastain v. Dickinson, 201
N. Y. 538, 94 N. E. 646 (1911).
Hiscock, J., in Shey v. Shey, "Again the terms employed by the
testato rebut the idea that he intended that subshares created on the
death of a child should be added to the principal of the respective trusts
for the benefit of other children and then carried forward as part of such
principal into still further subdivisions measured by and continued
through other lives."
In Matter of Colgrove, 221 N. Y. 455, 117 N. E. 813 (1918), testator
bequeathed $15,000 to one H. to be invested, and to apply the income to
the use of three of his grandchildren, during their minority, and as they
acquired majority to pay over one-third of the fund. In the event that
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whenever possible, endeavor to hold valid the instrument of trust and
13
to find in ambiguous declarations an expression of a lawful intent.
14
For example, in Shey v. Shey, the testator directed the division of
his residuary estate into five equal parts, one part to be held in trust
for each of his five children until they should attain a certain age
when they were to receive the principal. If any child should die
before attaining said age, leaving issue, then his share was to go to
the issue absolutely, but if he left no issue, then his share was to be
divided among the four remaining, "for the same use and subject to
the same conditions, as I have in this instrument directed or will
direct their share of my estate to be held." It was held that the
intention of the testator was that no further division of a subportion
was to be made upon the death of any of the four surviving children,
and that the trust ended as to each subportion upon the death of the
child receiving it.
As has been said above, courts favor that construction of an
instrument which will render it valid, or as much of it valid as possible, and this is especially so in the case of a will. Thus where part
of the trust is valid and part invalid, if the good can be separated
from the bad, the courts will uphold that which is valid. 15 Where
the primary intention of the creator accords with the rules of law,
an ulterior limitation whereby he attempts to effect an invalid suspension may be disregarded.' 6 Thus in Carrier v. Carrier,' 7 the
any of the beneficiaries died before majority leaving issue, then his share
was to go to such issue, if he left no issue, then the trustee was directed
to apply the income and profits thereof to the use of the survivor or
survivors of said beneficiaries until said survivor or survivors should attain majority when the trust fund should be disposed of in whole or in
equal shares in accordance with previous provisions. The court held that
the last mentioned provision was void. Crane, J., "These clauses taken in
connection with other parts of the will indicate an intention upon the
part of the testator to keep the trust fund in the event stated tied up
until the youngest of the three grandchildren arrives at the age of
twenty-one."
"Mee v. Gordon, 187 N. Y. 400, 80 N. E. 353 (1907); DuBois v.
Ray, 35 N. Y. 162 (1886); Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 368.
" Supra, note 11.
"'Harrison v. Harrison, 36 N. Y. 543 (1867); Matter of Murray, 75
N. Y. App. Div. 246, 78 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1902); James v. Beasley, 14
Hun 520 (1878), "It is perfectly well settled that if the purposes of a
trust are separable, and some of them must arise within two lives, and
there are others which must or may become operative only after the expiration of two lives, the former may be sustained, but the latter cannot.
"Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 143 N. E. 655 (1919). In Matter
of Horner, 237 N. Y. 489, 143 N. E. 655 (1924), Cardozo, J., said, "The
provision that in given circumstances a share shall fall hack into the
general body of the trust, and remain unsevered from the bulk is so
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income of a trust was to be used for the maintenance of a family.
On the death of the husband the income was to be paid to the wife;
and after her death the fund was to be divided into two equal parts
and held in trust for the benefit of each of two daughters. It was
held that although the trusts for the benefit of the daughters were
void, yet the trust for the family purpose was valid. In his opinion,
Cardozo, J., stated, "The grantor's purpose is not doubtful. He
wished to maintain the family as a unit while he and his wife or
either of them lived. During that time there was to be a single trust."
A. M. L.

MORTGAGE OR CONDITIONAL

SALE?

In New York, the Court of Appeals has said that, "Courts exist
for the purpose of 'ameliorating the harshness of ancient laws inconsistent with modern progress when it can be done without interfering
with vested rights."'
Was the New York Court of Appeals alive
to the real opportunity for amelioration presented to it in the very
recent Youssoupoff case?
In Youssoupoff v. Widener, 2 the plaintiff, a destitute and exiled
Russian prince residing in London delivered to defendant two valuable Rembrandts under a contract giving the plaintiff a right to repurchase within a certain period, provided that "this privilege of
repurchase will be exercised only in case he (Youssoupoff) finds himself in the position again to keep and personally enjoy these wonderful
works of art."
Before the expiration of the stipulated period,
a sum which he had borrowed and which would
whole. This the defendant refused, on the ground
redemption had been lost since the plaintiff could
with the terms of the contract.

plaintiff tendered
make defendant
that the right of
not fully comply

subordinate in importance and so separable in function that we are at
liberty to cut it off, and preserve what goes before."
"What he had in mind was a primary desire that each child at
majority should have an equal share of the principal, a fourth of the
entire fund, with a secondary desire that if this became impossible, the
fourth should go to issue, and in default of issue should be retained, as
an accretion to the whole. * * * We carry out his purpose when we
treat the four shares of principal as having a several existence in his
thought, from the beginning to the vicissitudes of several limitations."
" Supra, note 14.
'Oppenheim v. Kreidel, 236 N. Y. 156, 165; 140 N. E. 227, 230
(1923).
'Youssoupoff v. Widener, 246 N. Y. 174; 158 N. E. 65 (1927).

